2023 On Proper Presupposition, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

2023 On Deniability, Mind (with A. Dinges)

2022 Agentive Duality Reconsidered, Philosophical Studies (with A. Loets)

2021 Conventional Evaluativity, Australasian Journal of Philosophy

2021 Variations on Anderson Conditionals, Theoretical Linguistics, 47/3-4, pp 297-311

2021 Taste, Traits, and Tendencies, Philosophical Studies, 78/4, pp 1183-1206 (with A. Dinges).

2021 Much at Stake in Knowledge, Mind and Language, 36/5, pp 729-749 (with A. Dinges).

2020 A Direction Effect on Taste Predicates, Philosophers' Imprint, 20/27, pp 1-22 (with A. Dinges).

2019 Presupposing Counterfactuality, Semantics and Pragmatics, 12, pp 1-23.

2019 Embedded Taste Predicates, Inquiry, 34/2, pp 1-22.

2019 Denial and Retraction: A Challenge for Theories of Taste Predicates, Synthese, 196/4, pp 1555-1573.

2018 The Cancellability Test for Conversational Implicatures, Philosophy Compass, 93/3, e12552.

2017 Jesus loves you!, Philosophical Studies, 174/1, pp 237-255.

2017 Biscuit Conditionals and Prohibited 'then', Thought, 6/2, pp 84-92.


2019 Faultless Disagreement. A Defense of Contextualism in the Realm of Personal Taste, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main.
Book symposion in Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung:
Précis (J. Zakkou)
Comments by Christian Nimtz
Comments by Dirk Kindermann
Replies (J. Zakkou)

Edited Volumes and Special Issues

2022 Perspectives on Taste, Routledge, London (with J. Wyatt and D. Zeman)
2022 Semantic Variability, Special Issue of Inquiry (with A. Dinges and E. Stei)


2021 Grenzen der Toleranz, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 75(3), 467-471.

Drafts (available on request)

Power Collapse
What distinguishes things that are endowed with agency from those that lack it? Some scholars in the Aristotelian tradition suggest a distinction in terms of two kinds of powers: agents have both one-way and two-way powers; non-agents, by contrast, have only one-way powers. I call this view Aristotelianism. In this paper, I examine different ways to think of one-way and two-way powers. First, I argue that the conditional analysis faces a problem that resists well-known repair strategies for conditional analyses of dispositions. Second, I argue that a prominent alternative to the conditional account, as well as variations of it, yield a certain form of Megarianism when combined with Aristotelianism: for non-agents, power collapses into actuality---that is, non-agents have the power to do something iff they're doing it. This might not be a knock-down argument against Aristotelianism, but it does seem cause for concern.

On Proper Presupposition
This paper investigates the norm of presupposition, as one pervasive type of indirect speech act. It argues against the view that sees presuppositions as an indirect counterpart of the direct speech act of assertion and proposes instead to consider them an indirect counterpart of the direct speech act of assumption. More concretely, it suggests that the norm that governs presuppositions is not an epistemic or doxastic attitude such as knowledge, justified belief, or mere belief; it's a practical attitude, most plausibly the attitude of rational acceptance. This view has important ramifications well beyond debates in philosophy of language and linguistics. It affects not only our view of which speech act sequences are fine and which are off; it bears on whether presuppositions can function as testimony, whether they can be lies, and whether they are ontologically committal, thus addressing central topics in epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics.

Entailed Conversational Implicatures
Many philosophers and linguistics agree that there are two kinds of conversational implicatures: there are not only the well-known paradigm examples of conversational implicatures that are not entailed by the sentences that are used to bring them about; there are also less-often discussed conversational implicatures that are entailed by the sentences in question. In this paper, I take a closer look by examining classical candidates as well as novel contenders for entailed conversational implicatures. I argue that one might rightly classify some of these cases as conversational implicatures but show that doing so has so far unnoticed consequences.

Varieties of Biscuit Conditionals
It is commonly assumed that there are at least two kinds of indicative conditionals: hypothetical and biscuit conditionals. It is also assumed that there is no analogous distinction within subjunctive conditionals. Subjunctive conditionals, it is generally agreed, are uniformly read hypothetically. In a recent paper, Swanson argues that this is not true: embedded in the contexts of wants and wishes, at least certain subjunctive conditionals are read in a biscuit-like fashion. In this paper, I shall go beyond Swanson's claim. I shall argue that there are indicative biscuit conditionals of four different kinds and that subjunctive versions of all of them can be read as biscuit conditionals, even outside the contexts of wants and wishes.